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Abstract 
The need for reconciliation of individualism and communitarianism 
in search for an ideal state has been the main preoccupation of social 
and political philosophers. Unlike other philosophers like Hobbes 
and Locke that view the individual and the state as being 
incompatible and therefore seek to achieve some sort of compromise 
between the two principles, Hegel believes that the individual and 
the state are mutually independent. For him, individual freedom 
understood as rational freedom is achieved through the rational 
institutions of the state. Thus, the state’s institutions must harmonise 
truly the collective interest with the objective good of individuals. 
The will of the state, the universal will is the good; it is the 
realisation of freedom and so is unquestionable. This paper discusses 
how Hegel reconciles individual freedom with the authority of the 
state. Besides, it argues that the absolutism of the Hegel’s state tends 
to restrict individual right and freedom which, in Hegel’s view, must 
be actualised in the state. Finally, this paper contends that Hegel’s 
reduction of freedom to rationality tends to encourage indiscriminate 
utilisation of human reason to create things that can erode human 
dignity and values. It suggests that the recognition of the place of 




Individualism is a political, social or moral outlook which 
emphasises individual interests, independence and freedom as 
opposed to statism, communitarianism or collectivism that stresses 
the interests and goals of the state, group or 
community.Totalitarianism is a political system in which the state 
wields absolute power and completely controls all aspects of 
people’s life. 
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The period of the Renaissance witnessed great advancement in 
science on the basis of observation, hypothesis and mathematic 
deduction. The Renaissance scientists like Galileo Galilei, Nicholas 
Copernicus, Sir Isaac Newton and Johannes Kepler discovered the 
natural laws of nature merely with the application of human reason. 
The scientific advancement made in this period had a profound 
effect on the minds of the Enlightenment philosophers who began to 
develop a stout belief in the capacity of human intellect, stressing 
rationalism and de-emphasising theocentric thinking. 
 For instance, Francis Bacon laid emphasis on the 
observation of empirical data as a basis for induction and for 
discovering causes of nature. It was the certainty and exactitude of 
mathematics and its successful application to scientific problems that 
made Descartes think that the essential characteristic of the 
mathematical method would reveal the right method for use in 
philosophy. He introduced the intellectual attitude known as 
‘Cartesian doubt’ which claims that reason must be applied to 
determine the truth or falsity of a given phenomenon. Descartes’ 
emphasis on rationalism became the staple of the 18th century 
philosophies. 
 The renewal of intellectual spirit and courage brought about 
a paradigm shift in human thoughts and relations. This paradigm 
shift is portrayed in the natural law of progress which claims that 
“human reason can discover scientific truths about the world and 
human nature and in turn this body of knowledge can be put into 
practice to improve human societies and living conditions.”
1
 
Consequently, modern philosophers such as Jean Jacque Rousseau, 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke applied reason to human nature and 
society in order to secure the natural rights of property, freedom and 
equality. 
 The rapid spread of the message of freedom and 
independence throughout Europe paved the way for the modern 
individualism which received wide currency with the secularisation 
and bureaucratisation of social and political institutions of European 
societies as well as the advent of capitalism. The Enlightenment and 
Kant’s idea of rational autonomy or freedom plays a significant role 
in Hegel’s political philosophy in which he seeks to reconcile the 
state with individual freedom. 
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Starting Points for Hegel’s Conception of Individualism 
Hegel derives his idea of the universal, the community, as an ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit) of a nation from Plato and Aristotle, and Greek 
experience in general. A Greek citizen regards himself as a political 
animal by nature and immerses himself in the politics and ethos of 
his city. As a member of the ethical community, his actions are 
guided “not by his self-interest or some private conception of 
happiness and virtue, but by the traditional ideals of his city,”
2
 which 
he willingly accepted. 
 Accordingly, respect for and submission to the established 
social morality or ethical life of the city is the true Greek ethical 
ideal. Hegel acknowledges that fulfilling one’s ethical duties is the 
concern of Plato’s Republic. However, Plato’s greatest undoing is to 
subdue elements of individual interests on the grounds that they 
undercut the existence of the Greek city-state. He does this by 
placing restrictions on property, marriage and career. His 
indifference to subjective freedom, in Hegel’s view, makes Greek 
ethical life defective. 
 Hegel also examines Rousseau’s concept of individual in the 
modern state. Rousseau maintains the primary of the individual over 
the state. He believes that established institutions and laws of the 
state are valid due to their voluntary acceptance by individuals. The 
conscience and will of the individuals are the basis of the civil state. 
Rousseau’s political thought is therefore antithetical to Plato’s and 
Greek political principle that gives priority to the community over 
the individual. Hegel explicitly states this antithesis in the lectures 
on the History of Philosophy thus: 
 
The lack of subjectivity is really the defect of the 
Greek ethical idea… Plato has not recognised 
knowledge, wishes and resolutions of the individual, 
nor his self reliance, and has not succeeded in 
combining them with his idea; but justice demands 
its rights for this just as much as it requires the 
higher elucidation of the same, and its harmony with 
the universal. The opposite of Plato’s principle is the 
principle of the conscious free will of individuals 
which in later times was more especially by 
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Rousseau raised to prominence: The necessity of the 
arbitrary choice of the individual, as individual, the 




Hegel agrees with Rousseau that liberty is the essential characteristic 
of the individual, for “to renounce one’s liberty is to renounce one’s 
manhood.”
4
 However, Hegel feels that Rousseau takes individualism 
to extreme by rejecting all established order as the objective and 
rational principle that guides individual will. For Rousseau, the only 
thing which is binding on individual will is what the individual 
freely gives his consent to. The implication of this is at “the will of 
each individual, unrestricted and unguided by anything except his 
own deeply felt conception of virtue or the common good”
5
 is the 
foundation of any political association or law. In this case, one’s will 
becomes the supreme arbiter of morality. 
 Hegel contends that the fact that there could be no freedom 
without the consent of individual will does not imply that such 
consent constitutes freedom. Although, the consent of one’s will is 
required to have freedom, it will become arbitrary and capricious 
without being guided by an objective, rational principle. Hegel 
asserts that Rousseau’s ideas of individual will and freedom and the 
reduction of the union of individuals in the state to a social contract 
are responsible for the French Revolution. Hegel’s concern is to find 
a unity of the individual and the state which transcends the 
limitations of a social contract. He “upholds individual rights as the 
basis of a distinctively modern form of liberty”
6
 without regarding 
freedom as independence. 
 Hegel incorporates most of the individual rights and 
freedom ordinarily associated with liberalism – a political doctrine 
that is primarily concerned with securing the life, liberty and 
property of the individual. However, Hegel’s rationale for 
incorporating these liberal elements is essentially not the same with 
that of traditional liberalism. He rejects the social contract upon 
which liberalism is theoretically founded and which makes the 
sovereign individual lies at the base of liberal doctrine. 
 He argues that the problem with classical liberalism is that it 
attributes individualistic end – the securing of the life, liberty and 
property of the individual – to the state. Besides liberalism claims 
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that individuals’ consensus is the foundation of the state so that 
established customs, laws and institutions have no validity unless 
individual voluntarily accept them. Hegel explains that classical 
liberalism mistakes civil society for the state whereas, in his view, 
both are quite different. In his own words: 
 
If the state is confused with civil society, and if its 
specific end is laid down as the security and 
protection of property and personal freedom, then 
the interest of the individuals as such becomes the 
ultimate end of their association, and it follows that 
membership of the state is something optional. But 
the state’s relation to the individual is quite different 
from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is 
only as one of its members that the individual 
himself has objectivity, genuine individuality and an 
ethical life. Unification pure and simple is the true 
content and aim of the individual, and the 




Therefore, for Hegel the state is not based on a contract and it is not 
a mere means to the satisfaction of the individualistic end. Rather, it 
is “the objective embodiment of that universality which represents 
the destiny and deepest essence of human beings.”
8
 Given that the 
State represents the rational essence of individuals, it is by necessity 
that the individual belongs to the State. As Hegel puts it: “It is the 
rational destiny [Bestimmung] of human beings to live within the 
State, an even if no State is yet present, reason requires that one be 
established.”
9
 He agrees with classical liberalism that the state exists 
to advance human freedom but his idea of freedom is different from 
the classical liberal one. The freedom which the liberal state seeks to 
promote is merely the freedom of the arbitrary will, which for Hegel, 
is antithetical to the universal form of the will. He contends that the 
union of individuals within the state amounts to “a contract, which 
accordingly based on their arbitrary will and opinions,”
10
 when the 
universal will is interpreted as merely the common element arising 
out of the will of all individuals. He interprets the universal will 
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rather in terms of the rational will, which for him, wills the freedom 
and thus itself. In the light of this, he asserts: 
 
In opposition to the principle of the individual will, 
we should remember the fundamental concept 
according to which the objective will is rational in 
itself, i.e in its concept, whether or not it is 
recognized by individuals [Einzelnen] and willed by 
them at their discretion – and that its opposite, 
knowledge and volition, the subjectivity of freedom 
(which is the sole content of the principle of the 
individual will) embodies only one (consequently 
one-sided) moment of the Idea of the rational  will, 
which is rational solely because it has being both in 
itself and for itself.
11 
 
Hegel insists that genuine free will must be the rational will that 
wills the universal. The rational will wills the universal, the freedom 
by willing the law and the state. He believes that the law and the 
state do not limit individual freedom unless “we understand freedom 
wrongly as arbitrary caprice and the satisfaction of our 
particularity.”
12
 Thus, freedom, conceived as rational freedom, is 
achieved in the law and the state. 
 By subordinating the subjective character of the individual 
will to the objectivity of the rational will, Hegel takes his departure 
from the traditional liberal conception of freedom. However, it does 
not imply that Hegel outrightly ignores the subjective aspect of 
freedom, for he maintains that “subjectivity of freedom constitutes 
one moment of the idea of the rational will.”
13
 In this way, Hegel 
finds a middle ground between the modern liberalism and 
contemporary communitarianism, thereby “partaking of the virtues 




Ethical Life (Sittlickeit) as the Bedrock of Individual Freedom 
and Rights 
Hegel does not conceive will as a separate faculty distinct from 
reason. For him, will and thought are two modes of reason. 
Individual will is really free only because the individual thinks and 
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knows himself. Free will is therefore viewed as thinking 
intelligence. Thus, individual freedom is bound up with self-
consciousness. An act of will implies that the individual accepts only 
courses of action he freely chooses to follow. 
However, when the content of one’s will comprises one’s impulses, 
desires and appetites, the will ceases to act in accordance with its 
rational nature and becomes arbitrary and indeterminate. Hegel holds 
that the arbitrary wills of individuals are inherent in the Hobbes’ 
state of nature where violence is the order of the day. Such impulse-
driven and egocentric individuals, who act arbitrarily and 
capriciously, are not free in Hegel’s thinking. 
 Hegel maintains that individuals realise freedom only in 
ethical life. For him, when man wills what is rational, he acts not as 
a particular individual but in accordance with the concept of ethics. 
True freedom is therefore ethical freedom and can only be actualised 
in an ethical community. He views ethical life as a ‘substance’ and 
individuals as its ‘accidents’. Ethical life moulds man’s nature; it is 
the soil in which individuals’ rights and morals grow. Hegel explains 
that the right and the moral cannot exist independently, they must 
have the ethical as their support and foundation, “for the right lacks 
the moment of subjectivity, while morality in turn possesses that 




 Ethical life encompasses the ethical norms or principles of 
actions which provide the substance of human choices and decisions. 
It finds expressions in duty which, for Hegel, does not restrict 
individual freedom, provided that freedom is not seen as 
indeterminate subjectivity or in the abstract. In duty the individual is 
liberated from reliance on natural impulses and is made to achieve 
his substantive freedom. Hegel’s concept of freedom can therefore, 
be viewed as the conscientious recognition and fulfilment of one’s 
ethical duties, for it is in duty that the individual attains his freedom. 
 Concrete freedom – the self-determination and self-
consciousness of a rational and ethical agent –reaches its fullest 
development in a politically organised community whose raison d’ 
etre is the realisation of common good or public interest. In Hegel’s 
perspective, common good constitutes the objective will of the 
community and is identical with the totality of rational laws and 
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institutions of the state. For him, “such will must express or manifest 
itself in the actual thinking and willing of individual citizens, 




 Accordingly the preservation of the unity-in-difference of 
the universal and subjective will results in rational self-
determination of the individual and the self-consciousness of the 
state. Individual freedom, conceived as rational self-determination, 
involves “the subordination of the natural instincts, impulses and 
desires to conscious reflection and to goals and purposes that are 
consciously chosen and that require commitment to rational 
principles in order to properly guide action.”
17
 Concrete freedom 
consists in the knowing and willing the universal and pursuing it 
actively as one’s ultimate goal. The universal hence cannot achieve 
completion without individual interests and cooperation of 
individuals knowing and willing it.  
 On the other hand, individuals “do not live as private 
persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these 
they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their activity 
is consciously aimed at none but the universal end.”
18
 Thus, for 
Hegel, “the unity of the subjective with the objective and absolute 
good is the ethical life, and in it we find the reconciliation which 
accords with the concept.”
19
 On the whole, freedom is conceived in 
an ethical, social and political context. Individual freedom is fully 
actualised in the structure of the state as an objective, rational system 
of wills. A well-constituted ethical life is the only guarantee of 
individual freedom and rights. 
 
The Place of Individualism in Hegel’s Political System 
Hegel’s idea of individualism is developed at the three moments of 
ethical life, namely, the family, civil society and the state. 
 
Family 
This is the first moment in the union of moral subjectivity and 
objectivity. The Absolute first objectifies itself in the family. 
Initially, the members of the family are united primarily by the bond 
of love or feeling so that the individual is not conscious of oneself as 
being independent, but only sees himself as a member of the family 
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to which he is bound. What it means is that one’s sense of 
individuality is within this undifferentiated unity of the family. Thus, 
“the family is what one might call a feeling – totality.”
20
 The will of 
each member of the family is expressed in the common property of 
the family. 
 In course of time, the submersion of particularity or 
individuality in a common life becomes intolerable for individuals 
and so each individual family member  strives to assert himself as 
particular (individual person), possessing his unique plan in life. In 
the wake of emergence of particularity out of the universality of 
family life, the undifferentiated unity of the family is broken up, 
thereby leading to the formation of civil society. 
 
Civil Society 
This represents the second moment of ethical life. Having escaped 
from family life and strived for independence, the self-interest and 
personal choice come to the fore in civil society as its dominant 
characteristic. There is civil society when individuals, who seek to 
satisfy their own needs at the family level, are “united in a form of 
economic organization for the better furtherance of their ends.”
21
 In 
other words, civil society is an assemblage of individuals for the 
actualisation of their goals. 
 Hegel gives supreme recognition to subjective freedom and 
particularity in civil society. In Philosophy of Right, he states that in 
an attempt to satisfy individual unlimited economic needs in civil 
society, we find particularity “indulging itself in all directions as it 
satisfies its needs, contingent arbitrariness, and subjective caprice.”
22
 
Therefore, the concern of individuals is the pursuit of their private or 
self interests in civil society without any conscious sense of unity of 
membership. 
 Here, there is a dialectic relation between the family and 
civil society. The family is the thesis, which civil society is the 
antithesis. Civil society is characterised by individualism and 
therefore stands as an antithesis to the unity of the family. Both the 
family and civil society are united on a higher plane in the concept 
of the state. The emergence of the state does not lead to the 
annulment or cancellation of the family and civil society since the 
three concepts are not mutually exclusive; they co-exist. Both the 
Aghamelu & Ejike: Hegel’s contributions to modern individualism... 
245 
 
family and civil society are therefore preserved in the state. What it 
implies is that the universality of the family life and the particularity 




This is the final moment in the development of social ethics. Hegel’s 
state is not human construction established freely by a social 
contract, rather “it is the absolute which objectifies itself in the State 
through the instrumentality of human beings and their activities.”
23
 
According to Copleston, “the State is the actuality of the rational 
will when this has been raised to the plane of universal self-
consciousness. It is thus the highest expression of objective spirit.”
24
 
The state is the highest level in the process of objectification of the 
Absolute Spirit. 
 Civil society is a means to an end, while the state is an end 
in itself. The State utilises civil society for the accomplishment of its 
ends. It “represents the rational ideal in the development and the 
truly spiritual element in civilization.”
25
 The family (thesis) and civil 
society (antithesis) are synthesised in the state. Therefore, the state 
“develops as the synthesis in which the thesis and the antithesis (the 
unity of the family and the diversity of society) are resolved, and 
preserved.”
26
 For Hegel, the principle of private liberty or individual 
freedom and personal choices are preserved in the state. Therefore, 
the selfhood of each member of the society is not annulled but 
fulfilled in the state. 
 In a bid to reconcile the state with individual freedom, Hegel 
insists that freedom is rationality, for “the I (the Will) comes to 
freedom through the process of thought.”
27
 The state possesses such 
a rationality which is basically a universal norm as opposed to 
individuality that has no standard other than whim and caprice. It 
follows therefore that the individual achieves rationality 
(universality) only in the context of the personal relations with the 




 What Hegel is driving at is that the individual pursues his 
freedom in furthering the interest of the body politic. Man is free 
when his conduct conforms to reason which is embodied in the laws 
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of the state. By acting reasonably, “the individual promotes his own 
(Reason’s) interest, for he is freed from personal whim, and thereby 
achieves his true stature as a man, i.e., as a free or reasonable 
being.”
29
 Hegel holds that the idea of human individuality is 
worthless without the political community and “so practically, the 
state and the individual are the same in essence.”
30
 
 According to Hegel, just as an organism is produced through 
various activities of its members, constituting an independent whole, 
so the state produces itself continually through the reciprocal 
determination of its parts and wholes. The laws of the state “are 
conscious expressions of the individuals that (directly or indirectly) 
create them. On the other hand, the laws infuse and determine all of 
the interactions occurring between the individual and the society.”
31
 
Hegel situates the objective freedom in the state within this 
reciprocal determination of the individual and community. Freedom 
therefore provides an organic mediation between the universal and 
the particular in the political community. Ware explains that 
freedom in Hegel’s thinking involves “the continuous recognition 
and transcendence of limitations through the joint development of 
the individual and the community.”
32
 On the one hand, it requires 
that the individual should be particularised in relation to the 
substantive universality of the political order. On the other hand, it 
demands that the laws of the political community should be 
particularised in relation to the rational universality of subjective 
thought. 
 In this way, both the substantive and subjective forms of 
universality are conceived of as being dependent on each other and 
actualised reciprocally through each other. Through the 
complementary activities of limitation and transcendence, the 
individual and the state contribute to each other’s transformation and 
attain reconciliation. The individual member of the state expresses 
this subjective freedom through his contribution to the determination 
and realisation of a substantive universality. He promotes his 
particular interest when he pursues self-consciously the universal 
development of the state. Therefore, for Hegel, subjective freedom is 
realised through the individual’s contribution to the advancement of 
substantive universality. 
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 The incorporation of subjective freedom in the Hegel’s state 
ensures internal harmony and stability of the state. This is because if 
“the individual does not find the satisfaction of his particularity in 
the state, the state will be weak; its universality will remain abstract, 
without actuality.”
33
 Hence, there is need for the rational law to be 
merged with the law of particular freedom. The state becomes 
actual, strong and stable when the individual’s particular end is 
identified with the universal. Hegel affirms that the modern state is 
strong and stable because it allows for the satisfaction of subjective 
freedom and presents itself as “the sole precondition of the 
attainment of particular ends and welfare.”
34
 
 Hegel’s ascertain that the recognition of particular interests 
in the state makes it stable and strong seems to contradict his stance 
that the state is not merely a means to the protection of the 
individual’s life, liberty and property. Nevertheless, the point Hegel 
is making is that the subjective ends of individuals must be fulfilled 
in the state as an instrument for the satisfaction of their ends. As he 
puts it:  
 
The state is actual only when its members have a 
feeling of their self-hood and it is stable only when 
public and private ends are identical. It has often 
been said that the end of the state is the happiness of 
the citizens. That imperfectly true. If all is not well 
with them, if their subjective aims are not satisfied, 
if they do not find that the state as such is the means 





However, what Hegel rejects is the liberal view that the ultimate end 
of the state is to advance particular interests or subjective freedom of 
individuals. His major concern is not about “the ultimate end of the 
state but what is necessary to make that end – the universal, rational 
freedom – actual and concrete.”
36
 He stresses the need for the private 
interest of individuals and the universal goal of the state to be united 
for the realisation of each other’s ends. For him, “everything 
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 Hegel does not want the substantiality of the state appear as 
something alien to the individual but as something in which the 
particularity of the individual is fulfilled so that the individual feels 
that his particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest 
and end of the state. He therefore insists that the personal wills of 
individuals should be given some sort of recognition in the process 
of universal legislation. In Philosophy of Right, he states that “the 
role [Bestimmung] of the Estates is to bring the universal interest 
[Angelegenheit] into existence [Existenz] not only in itself but also 




 In other words, the state enters into subjective consciousness 
of the people and the people participate in it through their 
corporations or estates. Hegel is cautious about this legitimate 
demand on subjectivity to avert the possibility of this demand 
degenerating into a radical demand that legislation should emanate 
directly from the subjective wills of the individual as exemplified in 
democratic individualism. This accounts for his insistence that 
individuals must be represented through their corporations. Thus, 
“particularity and subjectivity are given due without being allowed 
to overwhelm the universality and rationality of the state.”
39
 
 The need of the state is attained in the particular activity of 
the individual. “The end motivating the activity of the individual 
member must be the interest of the whole, while the end motivating 
the action of the whole must be the individual.”
40
 This means that 
the individual promotes the ends of the whole in pursuing his 
particular end. Hegel expresses thus that the actuality of the state 
“consists in the fact that the interest of the whole realizes itself 
through the particular ends.”
41
 In this way, Hegel reconciles the 
subjectivity of the individual and the substantivity of the political 
community without sacrificing the freedom of the individual or the 
authority of the state. 
 
The Place of Totalitarianism in Hegel’s Political System 
Totalitarianism is a political system in which the state wields 
absolute power and completely controls all aspects of people’s life. 
Although Hegel’s idea of individualism does not necessarily lead to 
totalitarianism or authoritarianism, the absolute power he grants to 
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the state tends to engender totalitarian rule. Hegel maintains that 
conscience (Gewissen) that identifies itself with the universal will is 
the mark of freedom. He insists that the rights of individuals must be 
compatible with the supreme rights of the universal will. In other 
words, the particular will must conform to the universal will. 
 In a bid to ensure that the individuals’ interests are identified 
with those of the state, he presents the state as an absolute entity to 
which every individual must be submissive unconditionally. For 
him, the will of the state is the universal will, the will of the 
Absolute, and so cannot be challenged or questioned by any 
individual. He recognises unlimited interference in the individuals’ 
rights and freedom. The implication of this is that the constitutional 
monarch, which Hegel advocates as the head of the state, wields 
absolute power so that the government is free to exercise control 
over the lives of its subjects by whatever means possible. In this 
way, Hegel makes his ideal state totalitarian in nature. 
 
Concluding Reflections 
Hegel’s idea of individualism is conceived within the framework of 
the state that embodies the rational will. Individual freedom consists 
in the unity of particular interests of individuals and universal 
interests. The state is the realisation of rational freedom. The 
individual actualises rational freedom through his reciprocal 
relationship with the state. He attains freedom when he absolutely 
conform his will to that of the state through the process of 
internalisation. On the other hand, the individual is not free when he 
acts arbitrarily and irrationally such that his will is antithetical to the 
universal will. Therefore, “freedom is identical with rationality; to be 
free is to be rational, and to be rational is to be free.”
42
 
 The end or purpose of the Hegel’s state is not the subjective 
freedom inherent in the liberal state but the rational freedom, the 
universal will which is in line with the universality of the human 
essence. “The rationality of the state is located in the realization of 
the universal substantial will in the self-consciousness of particular 
individuals elevated to consciousness of universality.”
43
 Through 
participation in the life of the state, the members are raised to the 
higher level of universal self-consciousness above their sheer 
particularity. Thus, the state is the embodiment of individuals’ 
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rational essence. “The ‘enormous strength’ of the modern state lies 
in the fact that the state’s ‘substantive unity’ rests on the principles 
of ‘subjectivity’ and personal particularity”
44
 so that through the 
institutions of the modern state, individual right and subjective 




 Hegel demonstrates how the ideas of the individual and the 
state can be interpreted without being incompatible. The tension 
between the two concepts is surpassed by their mutual dependence. 
To act freely is not to make an unrestricted choice but to align one’s 
subjective choice with a substantial order so that one’s identity is 
bound up with the state. In this organic conception of the state the 
tension between the individual and the state is resolved and their 
claims become fully satisfied. For classical liberals such as Hobbes 
and Locke, the solution to the tension between the individual and the 
state is sought in some sort of compromise between the two 
principles. Steinberger refers to this liberal approach as 
‘accommodationism’. On the contrary, Hegel adopts a perfectionist 
approach to the problem of the individual and the state. He tries to 
resolve the problem by subjecting the individual and the state to 
conceptual analysis and reinterpreted them in such a way that they 
are no longer seen as antagonistic to each other but as mutually 
dependent. 
 On the whole, Hegel draws our attention to the fact that 
individual rights such as property rights and civil liberties are all 
bound up with the social and political context of the state. “Our 
freedom and dignity demands the recognition of others in order to be 
realized.”
46
 The State secures individual freedom through political 
and legal institutions of the state. For instance, through the rule of 
law, orders and rights are secured and freedom realised. Hence, the 
institutions of the state are instruments that advance individual 
freedom and happiness, and, in so doing, the state commands 
citizens’ respect, trust and loyalty. The good of the individual cannot 
be set aside from the common good or welfare of the state. 
 Hegel insists that human rights and freedom should be 
preserved and promoted in the state. For him, “a more rational 
constitution means a more liberal constitution, at least in the sense 
that it must explicitly allow for the free development of individual 
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personality and respect the rights of individuals.”
47
 However, by 
making his ideal state totalitarian in nature, Hegel tends to restrict 
private freedom and encourage abuse of human rights. A 
constitutional monarch, who wields absolute power, can become 
despotic. In the light of this, Lord Action remarks that “power tends 
to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
48
 The absolutism 
of the state can engender ruthless disregard for basic human rights. 
The power of the state need not be absolute in order to contain the 
irrational aspect of human desires. As John Locke indicates, it is 
possible to have both law and order in the state without making it 
absolute. 
 Hegel views the state as the highest level in the process of 
objectification or expression of the Absolute Spirit/Mind. For him, 
the Absolute is the totality of reality which is rationality, for what is 
real is rational and what is rational is real. The state is the actuality 
of the Absolute will, the rational will. Individual freedom is 
therefore identical with rationality. The individual realises his 
freedom when his interests and will coincide with the rational will, 
the will of the Absolute. In this way, Hegel reduces the whole of 
reality to rationality and regards the Absolute as an end in and for 
itself. 
 Thus, Hegel’s absolute idealism accentuates the power of 
human reason to comprehend the essence of things, without any 
recourse to God who confers intelligibility on the world. When 
ethical and spiritual dimensions of human beings are ignored in our 
efforts towards advancing the frontiers of human knowledge and 
power, human values and dignity are lost. In this case, human person 
becomes depersonalised and is treated as a mere object or tool. 
 It is against this background that Soren Kierkegaard strongly 
condemns the loss of human values in Western civilisation which 
accords no importance to the absolute value and dignity of the 
human person. Human being are being dehumanised, 
instrumentalised and turned into machines in Western civilisation. 
The problem is that Western civilisation with its scientific and 
technological advances, built on materialistic worldview and so it 
pursues material achievement at the expense of the spiritual and 
moral development of the human person. 
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 Hegel’s emphasis on the power of human reason alone to 
invent and comprehend things without recognising the place of God 
in human thought and history engenders erosion of moral values and 
human dignity. God is the suprasensory ground and goal of reality. 
The very idea of God imposes a moral obligation on human beings 
to respect and promote human values and dignity. The fact that God 
confers intelligibility on the world and creates values makes human 
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